BOOK I-GENERAL PART

TITLE II-THE ACT

CHAPTER I-BASES OF PUNISHABILITY

Article 10
Commission by action and by omission

1. When a legal type of crime includes a certain result, the fact comprises not only the action proper to produce it, as the omission of the action proper to avoid it, except if the intention of the law is different.

2. The commission of a result by omission is only punishable when the omissive person is under a legal duty that personally obliges him to avoid that result.

3. In the case prescribed in the previous number, punishment can be especially mitigated.


Article 11
Individual nature of criminal responsibility

Unless otherwise stated, only individuals are liable to criminal responsibility.


Article 12
Acting on behalf of another

1- Whoever acts voluntarily as head of an organ of a corporation, society or mere de facto
association, or in legal or voluntary representation of another, is punishable, even when the respective crime type requires:
a) Certain personal elements and these are only present in the person of the represented; or
b) That the agent executes the act in its own interest and the representative acts in the interest of the represented.

2- The ineffectiveness of the act that serves as foundation to the representation does not prevent the application of what is determined in the previous number.


Article 13
Intent and Negligence

Only acts committed with intent are punishable or, in the cases especially prescribed in the law, with negligence.


Article 14
Intent

1- Whoever, representing an act that constitutes a type of crime, carries it on, with the purpose of accomplishing it, acts with intent.

2- A person still acts with intent when he represents the accomplishment of an act that constitutes a type of crime as a necessary consequence of his conduct.

3- When the accomplishment of an act that constitutes a type of crime is represented as a possible consequence of the conduct, there is intent if the agent acts accepting that accomplishment.


Article 15
Negligence

A person acts with negligence when he does not behave with the care to which, according to circumstances, is obliged and is capable of, and:
a) Represents as possible the accomplishment of an act that constitutes a type of crime, but acts without accepting that accomplishment; or
b) Does not even represent the possibility of the accomplishment of that act.


Article 16
Mistake about circumstances of the act

1- The Mistake about fact or law elements of a type of crime or about prohibitions the knowledge of which is reasonably indispensable for the agent to become aware of the act unlawfulness excludes intent.

2- The rule established in the previous number applies to the mistake about a state of things that, if existing, would have excluded the unlawfulness of the fact or the agent’s fault.

3- Punishability is safeguarded in negligence general terms.


Article 17
Mistake about unlawfulness

1- A person acts without fault when he acts unaware of the unlawfulness of the act, if his mistake is not censurable.

2- If his mistake is censurable, the agent is punished with the sentence applicable to the respective intentional crime, which can be especially mitigated.


Article 18
Aggravation of penalty for the result

When the penalty applicable to an act is aggravated according to the production of a result, the
aggravation is always conditioned by the possibility of attributing that result to the agent at least by negligence.


Article 19
Imputability by reason of age

Minors under 16 are not imputable.


Article 20º
No imputability by reason of a disease of the mind

1- A person is not imputable if, due to a disease of the mind, he is incapable, at the time of committing the act, to appreciate its unlawfulness or to conform his conduct in accordance with that appreciation.

2- A person may be declared not imputable if, due to a serious disease of the mind, not accidental and whose effects he cannot control, without being thereby censurable, has, at the time of
committing the act, the capacity to appreciate its unlawfulness or to conform his conduct in
accordance with that appreciation, sensibly diminished.

3- The agent’s proved incapacity to be influenced by punishment may constitute a sign of the situation defined in the previous number.

4- Imputability is not excluded when the disease of the mind has been caused by the agent himself with the intention to commit the act.

Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.