General Part


Section 1.

Criminal legislation

Chapter 1.

Principles and objectives of criminal legislation

Article 4. Principles of criminal legislation.

The Criminal Code is based on the principles of legitimacy, equality before the law, inevitable liability, personal liability, liability in accordance with the offence, individuality of justice and liability, and humanism .

General Part


Section 1.

Criminal legislation

Chapter 1.

Principles and objectives of criminal legislation

Article 8. Principle of personal liability.

The individual is subject to criminal liability only for the offence committed personally .

General Part

Section 2.

Crime.

Chapter 5.

Guilt.

Article 28. Types of guilt.
1. The guilt is manifested willfully or through negligence.
2. An action committed through negligence is a crime if it is particularly envisaged in the Special Part of this Code .

Article 29. Committal of willful crime.
1. A willful crime can be manifested in direct or indirect willfulness.
2. A crime is considered directly willful if the person understood the danger of his action (inaction) for the society, had foreseen the dangerous consequences for the society and desired the emergence of these consequences .
3. A crime is considered indirectly willful if the person understood the danger of his action (inaction) for the society, had foreseen the dangerous consequences for the society, did not desire the emergence of these consequences but knowingly allowed them to take place .
4. If the law does not link the criminal liability for the accomplished criminal act to the emergence of certain consequences, the crime is considered willfully committed, if the person who committed it understood the danger of his actions for the society and was willing to commit it.
5. For the aggravating circumstances of the willful crime, the person is subject to criminal liability, if the latter understood these circumstances.

Article 30. Committal of negligent crime.
1. A crime committed through negligence can be manifested through self-confidence or carelessness.
2. A crime is considered committed through self-confidence, if the person had foreseen the possible dangerous nature of one’s action (inaction) for the society, but without sufficient grounds self-confidently hoped that these consequences will be prevented.
3. A crime is considered committed through carelessness, if the person had not foreseen the possible dangerous nature of one’s action (inaction) for the society, although in the given circumstances he was obliged and was able to foresee them.

Article 31. Inflicting damage without guilt
1. An act is considered to have been committed without guilt, if the person did not understand and, in the given circumstances, could not understand the social danger of one’s actions (inaction) or did not foresee the possible socially dangerous consequences thereof, and in the given circumstances was not obliged and could not foresee them.
2. Also, an act is considered to have been committed without guilt, if the person had foreseen the possible socially dangerous consequences of one’s action (inaction), did not wish the emergence thereof, but due to the incompatibility of one’s psychological and physiological properties with the extreme conditions or nervous and mental load, failed to prevent the emergence of these consequences.

Article 32. Liability for crimes with two types of guilt.
If the law envisages a more strict liability for a willful crime which caused severe consequences through negligence, then the person is liable for these consequences only when one had foreseen the possible social danger of one’s action (inaction), however, without good reason, self-confidently hoped that these consequences will be prevented, or had not foreseen the possible consequences of his socially dangerous action (inaction), although in the given circumstances one was obliged to and could foresee them. Such a crime must be considered willfully committed.

Chapter 6.

Completed and unfinished crime.

Article 33. Completed and unfinished crime.
1. A crime is considered completed, if the action incorporates all the elements of crime envisaged in this Code.
2. Attempts to commit a crime and the preparation for grave and particularly grave crimes are considered an unfinished crime.
3. The liability for attempts to commit a crime and the preparation for crime is under the same article of the Special Part of this Code as for complete crimes, referring to Articles 34 or 35 of this Code.

Article 34. Attempt to commit a crime.
Attempt at a crime is the action (inaction) committed through direct willfulness immediately aimed at the committal of crime, if the crime was not finished for reasons beyond the person’s control .

Article 35. Preparation of crime.
Preparation of a crime is the procurement of means or tools or their adaptation for committal of a direct willful crime, as well as willful creation of other conditions for committal of crime, if the crime was not finished for reasons beyond the person’s control.

Article 36. Voluntary refusal from a crime.
1. Voluntary refusal is the termination by the person of preparation or termination of action (inaction) directly aimed at the committal of crime, when the person realized the possibility of completion of the crime.
2. The person who refused to complete the crime is not subject to criminal liability, unless his actually committed act contains other elements of crime.
3. If the organizer of the crime, the abettor or helper refuse voluntarily, they are not subject to criminal liability, provided this person informed the state bodies or through other means and prevented the completion of the crime by the perpetrator.
4. If the actions mentioned in part 3 of this Article did not prevent the committal of the crime by the perpetrator, then, when sentencing, these actions can serve as circumstances mitigating the liability and the sentence.

Chapter 7.

Complicity.

Article 37. The notion of complicity.
Willful joint participation of two or more persons in a willful crime is considered complicity.

Article 38. Types of accomplices.
1. The organizer, the abettor and the helper are considered the accomplices to the perpetrator.
2. The perpetrator is the person who immediately committed the crime or immediately participated in its committal with other persons (accomplices), as well as the one who committed the crime through the use of persons not subject to legal criminal liability or the persons who committed a crime through negligence.
3. The organizer is the person who arranged or directed the committal of the crime, as well as, the one who created an organized group for committal of crime or criminal association or directed the latter.
4. The abettor is the person who abetted another person to the committal of crime through persuasion, financial incentive, threat or other means.
5. The helper is the person who assisted to the crime through pieces of advice, instructions, information or provided means, tools, or eliminated obstacles, as well as, the person who had previously promised to harbor the criminal, to hide the means and tools of crime, the traces of the crime or the items procured through crime, as well as, also, the person who had previously promised to acquire or sell such items.

Article 39. The liability of accomplices.
1. The co-perpetrators are subject to liability for the crime under the same article of this Code.
2. The organizer, the abettor and the perpetrator are subject to liability under the article which envisages the committed crime, referring to Article 38 of this Code, except those cases when they were at the same time the co-perpetrators of the crime.
3. The person who is not a special subject of the crime in the article of the Special Part of this Code, who participated in the committal of the crime envisaged in this Article, can be liable for this crime only as an organizer, an abettor or helper.
4. In the case when the crime was not completed for reasons beyond control of the perpetrator, the other accomplices are liable for the preparation of the crime or for complicity in the attempt at the crime.
5. If the organizer, the abettor or the helper fail in their actions for reasons beyond their control, then these persons are liable for the preparation of the respective crime.
6. The accomplices are subject to liability only for those aggravating circumstances of the crime of which they were aware.
7. When subjecting the accomplices to liability, the nature and degree of the participation of each of them in the crime are taken into account .

Article 40. Excess of performer.
1. Excess of performer is committal of such a crime by a person that exceeds the willfulness of other accomplices.
2. Other accomplices are not liable for the excess of performer.

Article 41. Committal of crime by a group of individuals, by an organized group or by a criminal association.
1. A crime is considered committed by a group of individuals without prior agreement, if the co-perpetrators who participated in the crime did not previously agree to commit the crime jointly .
2. A crime is considered committed by a group of individuals with prior agreement, if the co-perpetrators who participated in the crime, prior to the commencement of the crime, agreed to commit the crime jointly .
3. A crime is considered committed by an organized group, if it was committed by a stable group of persons who previously united to commit one or more crimes .
4. A crime is considered committed by a criminal association, if it was committed by a consolidated organized group created to commit grave or particularly grave crimes, or by uniting an organized group for the same purposes, as well as if it was committed by a member (members) of the association to achieve his criminal purposes, as well as, committal of a crime by a person not considered a member of the association, by instruction of the criminal association.
5. The person who created or directed an organized group, a criminal association, is subject to liability in cases envisaged in the appropriate articles of this Code: for the creation or direction of an organized group or criminal association, as well as, for all crimes committed by them, if they were involved by his willfulness. Other persons involved in the criminal association are subject to liability for participation in this organization and for those crimes which they committed or prepared .
6. The persons mentioned in this Article incur liability without referral to Article 38 of the Special Part of this Code .

Chapter 8.

Circumstances excluding the criminality of the act.

Article 42. Necessary defense.
1. The action committed in the state of necessary defense, is not considered a crime, i.e., when defending the life, health and rights of the defender or other person, or defending the state interests from socially dangerous encroachments, or from a real threat, defending oneself by inflicting damage to the perpetrator of the encroachment, provided the necessary defense was not exceeded.
2. When defending a person’s life from dangerous violence or real threat of such violence, any damage can be inflicted, including death.
3. The person is entitled to the right of necessary defense, regardless of the possibility to avoid the encroachment or to appeal to other persons or state bodies, as well as, regardless of the person’s special training or official position.
4. Such deliberate actions which obviously for the self-defender are inadequate with the nature and extent of danger of the encroachment are considered acts of excessive defense.
5. Use of weapon or any other means or objects for the purpose of defense from assault of an armed person or assault of a group of persons, as well as for the purpose of prevention of illegal and forced intrusion into an apartment or other building, is not considered an act of excessive defense, irrespective of the degree of damage incurred by the offender .

Article 43. Inflicting damage when capturing the perpetrator.
1. The actions whereby damage was inflicted to the perpetrator when capturing him, in order to hand him over to the authorized bodies or to prevent him from committing new socially dangerous actions, are not considered a crime, provided the necessary measures have not been exceeded.
2. The measures necessary to capture the perpetrator are considered excessive, if there is obvious disproportion between the capturing measures and the danger of the action and the perpetrator, as well as, the circumstances of capture, as a result of which damage was willfully inflicted to the person which was not determined by the necessity of capturing.
3. The act of excessive damage inflicted when capturing the perpetrator is a crime, if this is particularly envisaged in the Special Part of this Code.
4. Except specially authorized parsons, the aggrieved person and other citizens also are entitled to capture the perpetrator of the crime .

Article 44. Urgent necessity.
1. Inflicting damage to the interests protected by criminal law in the state of urgent necessity, is not considered a crime, i.e., to eliminate the imminent danger to the life, health, rights and legal interests of the given person or persons, to the interests of the society or the state, if this danger could not be eliminated by other means and no limits of urgent necessity have been exceeded.
2. Willfully inflicted damage obviously disproportionate to the imminent danger, its degree and the considerations of elimination of the danger, when the legally protected interests suffered equal or greater damage compared to the prevented damage, is considered exceeding of urgent necessity .

Article 45. Physical or psychiatric enforcement.
1. Inflicting damage to the interests protected by criminal law by means of physical or psychiatric enforcement, is not considered a crime, if as a result of this enforcement the person could not control his actions (inaction).
2. The issue of criminal liability, when damage is inflicted to legally protected interests by means of physical or psychiatric enforcement, which do not deprive the person of the capability of controlling one’s actions, is resolved taking into account the propositions of Article 46 of this Code .

Article 46. Justified risk.
1. Inflicting damage to the interests protected by criminal law is not considered a crime, when undertaking justified risk to achieve socially useful goals.
2. Risk is considered justified, if the mentioned goal could not be achieved without an action (or inaction) of risk, and when the risking person takes measures to prevent the danger to the interests protected by criminal law.
3. Risk is considered unjustified, if it obviously involves the death of third persons, or the threat of an ecological or public disaster .

Article 47. Execution of an order or instruction.
1. Inflicting damage to the interests protected by criminal law, by the person who acted pursuant to compulsory, appropriately given order or instruction, is not considered a crime. The person who gave such illegal order or instruction is liable for that.
2. The person who committed a willful crime by obviously illegal order or instruction is liable on common grounds .
3. Refusal to execute an obviously illegal order or instruction is an exemption from criminal liability .

Special Part

Section 13.

Crimes against peace and human security

Chapter 33.

Crimes against peace and human security

Article 391. Inaction or making an illegal command during armed conflict.

1. During armed conflict, failure to take all possible measures by the commander or official, within the authority of the latter, to prevent crimes under Articles 387, 390 by the subordinates, if the commander knew or had information, which in the given situation should have helped him to conclude that the subordinate is committing or tends to commit an offence, and if within his authority, he did not take all possible measures to prohibit or to prevent this violation,
is punished with imprisonment for 5-10 years.

2. The same action which was committed recklessly, is punished with imprisonment for 2-5 years.

3. During armed conflict, an order by the commander or official to the subordinate not spare anybody’s life or other obviously criminal order, aimed at the committal of crimes envisaged in Articles 387, 390, is punished with imprisonment for 5-15 years.

Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.