PART IV
GENERAL RULES AS TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Ignorance of law
7. Ignorance of the law does not afford any excuse for any act or omission which would otherwise constitute an offence unless knowledge of the law by the offender is expressly declared to be an element of the offence.


Bona fide claim of right
8. A person is not criminally responsible in respect of an offence relating to property, if the act done or omitted to be done by him with respect to the property was done in the exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud.


Intention
9. (1) Subject to the express provisions of this Code relating to negligent acts and omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission which occurs independently of the exercise of his will, or for an event which occurs by accident.

(2) Unless the intention to cause a particular result is expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole or part, by an act or omission, the result intended to be caused by an act or omission is immaterial.

(3) Unless otherwise expressly declared, the motive by which a person is induced to do or omit to do an act or to form an intention is immaterial so far as regards criminal responsibility.


Mistake of fact
10. (1) A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any act state of things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as he believed to exist.

(2) The operation of this rule maybe excluded by the express or implied provisions of the law relating to the subject.


Presumption of Sanity
11. Every person is presumed to be of sound mind, and to have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question, until the contrary is proved.


Insanity
12. Subject to the express provisions of this Code and of any other law in force a person shall not be criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is through any disease affecting his mind incapable of understanding what he is doing, or of knowing a that he ought not to do the act or make the omission:

Provided that a person may be criminally responsible for an act or omission, although his mind is affected by disease, if such disease does not in: fact produce upon his mind one or other of the effects above mentioned in reference to that act or omission.


Intoxication
13. (1) Save as provided in this section intoxication shall not constitute a defence to any criminal charge.

(2) Intoxication shall be a defence to any criminal charge if by reason thereof the person charged at the time of the act or omission complained of did not know that such act or omission was wrong or did not know what he was doing and-

(a) the state of intoxication was caused without his consent by the malicious or negligent act of another person; or

(b) the person charged was by reason of intoxication insane, temporarily or otherwise, at the time of such act or omission.

(3) Where the defence under the preceding subsection is established, then in a case falling under paragraph (a) thereof the accused shall be discharged and in a case falling under paragraph (b) the provisions of this Code and of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to insanity shall apply.
Cap. 17

(4) Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the person charged had formed any intention, specific or otherwise, in the absence of which he would not be guilty of the offence.

(5) For the purpose of this section "intoxication" shall be deemed to include a state produced by narcotics or drugs.


Immature age
14. (1) A person under the age of 10 years is not criminally responsible for any act or omission.

(2) A person under the age of 14 years is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, unless it is proved that at the time of doing the act or making the omission be had capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.

(3) A male person under the age of 12 years is presumed to be incapable of having sexual intercourse.


Judicial officers
15. Except as expressly provided by this Code, a judicial officer is not criminally responsible for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions, although the act done is in excess of his judicial authority or although he is bound to do the act omitted to be done.


Compulsion
16. A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if it is committed by 2 or more offenders, and if the act is done or omitted only because during the whole of the time in which it is being done or omitted the person is compelled to do or omit to do the act by threats on the part of the other offender or offenders instantly to kill him or do him grievous bodily harm if he refuses, but threats of future injury do not excuse any offence.


Defence of person or property
17. Subject to any express provisions in this Code or any other law in operation in the Gilbert Islands, criminal responsibility for the use of force in the defence of person or property shall be determined according to the principles of English common law.

PART IV
GENERAL RULES AS TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Compulsion by husband
19. A married woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act merely because the act or omission takes place in the presence of her husband; but on a charge against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder, it shall be a good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, the husband.

PART V
PARTIES TO OFFENCES

Principal offenders
21. (1) When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with actually committing it, that is to say-

(a) every person who actually does the act or makes the omission which constitutes the offence;

(b) every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of enabling or aiding another person to commit the offence;

(c) every person who aids or abets another person in committing the offence;

(d) any person who counsels or procures any other person to commit the offence.

(2) In the last mentioned case he may be charged either with committing the offence or with counselling or procuring its commission.

(3) A conviction of counselling or procuring the commission of an offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a conviction of committing the offence.

(4) Any person who procures another to do or omit to do any act of such a nature that, if he had himself done the act or made the omission, the act or omission would have constituted an offence on his part, is guilty of an offence of the same kind, and is liable to the same punishment, as if he had himself done the act or made the omission; and he may be charged with doing the act or making the omission.


Offences committed by joint offenders in prosecution of common purpose
22. When 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence.


Counselling another to commit an offence
23. When a person counsels another to commit an offence, and an offence is actually committed after such counsel by the person to whom it is given, it is immaterial whether the offence actually committed is the same as that counselled or a different one, or whether the offence is committed in the way counselled or in a different way, provided in either case that the facts constituting the offence actually committed are a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel.

In either case the person who gave the counsel is deemed to have counselled the other person to commit the offence actually committed by him.

If the facts constituting the offence actually committed are not a probable consequence of carrying out the counsel, the person who gave the counsel is not deemed to be responsible.

Article 25
Individual criminal responsibility
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.