CHAPTER ONE
General Provisions

PART II
JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

Automatism

Automatism
47. A person is not guilty of an offence if —
(a) he or she acts in a state of automatism where the act alleged to constitute the offence is committed by him or her involuntarily so that he or she has no control over his or her physical activities due to some external factor which causes him or her to be unconscious or otherwise act without his or her will; and
(b) the act or condition is not the result of anything done intentionally or recklessly or as a result of voluntary intoxication.

CHAPTER ONE
General Provisions

PART III
LIABILITY AND MENS REA

Causing an Event

Causing event by involuntary agent
52.— (1) Where a person intentionally, recklessly or negligently causes any involuntary agent to cause an event, that person shall be deemed to have caused the event.

CHAPTER ONE
General Provisions

PART III
LIABILITY AND MENS REA

Causing an Event

Several persons causing event
53.— (1) Where an event is caused by acts of several persons acting either jointly or independently, each of those persons who has intentionally, recklessly or negligently contributed to cause the event shall, subject to the provisions of Part IV of this Chapter, be deemed to have caused the event.

CHAPTER ONE
General Provisions

PART III
LIABILITY AND MENS REA

Intent

Intent
56.— (1) A person who voluntarily commits an act is presumed to intend the consequence of the act if he or she believes in the probability of the consequence occurring or commits the act with the purpose of achieving the consequence.

(2) In determining whether a person has committed an offence with the requisite intent the Court may infer the requisite intent from the act committed by the person and the relevant surrounding circumstances taking into account the following factors —
(a) the emotional motive which prompted the person to commit the act;
(b) the person’s reasons or purposive motive for committing the act or the ultimate purpose which the person sought to achieve by committing the act;
(c) the person’s desire for the consequence of the act;
(d) the person’s subjective foresight or belief in the degree of probability of the consequence of the act; and
(e) the person’s subjective honest or actual belief in the existence of certain circumstances which motivated the commission of the act.


Transferred Intention
57. Where a person intends to commit a particular crime and brings about the elements which constitute that crime he or she may be guilty of that crime notwithstanding that the crime takes effect in a manner which was unintended or unforeseen.

CHAPTER ONE
General Provisions

PART IV
PARTICIPATION AND INCHOATE OFFENCES

Attempts

Attempt to commit crime
77.— (1) If, with intent to commit an offence a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he or she commits the offence of attempting to commit the offence.

(2) A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.

(3) Where but for this subsection a person’s intention would not otherwise be regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence, if however the facts of the case had been as he or she believed them to be, his or her intention would be so regarded then for the purposes of subsection (1), he or she shall be regarded as having had an intent to commit that offence.